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Abstract:  
This paper investigates the role that imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy 
plays in the formation of expectations, macroeconomic dynamics, and the efficient 
formulation of monetary policy. Economic agents rely on an adaptive learning technology to 
form expectations and to update continuously their beliefs regarding the dynamic structure of 
the economy based on incoming data. The process of perpetual learning introduces an 
additional layer of dynamic interaction between monetary policy and economic outcomes. We 
find that policies that would be efficient under rational expectations can perform poorly when 
knowledge is imperfect. In particular, policies that fail to maintain tight control over inflation 
are prone to episodes in which the public’s expectations of inflation become uncoupled from 
the policy objective and stagflation results, in a pattern similar to that experienced in the 
United States during the 1970s. Our results highlight the value of effective communication of 
a central bank’s inflation objective and of continued vigilance against inflation in anchoring 
inflation expectations and fostering macroeconomic stability. 
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 1 Introduction
Rational expectations provides an elegant and powerful framework that has come to dom-
inate thinking about the dynamic structure of the economy and econometric policy evalu-
ation over the past 30 years. This success has spurred further examination into the strong
information assumptions implicit in many of its applications. Thomas Sargent (1993) con-
cludes that “rational expectations models impute much more knowledge to the agents within
the model ... than is possessed by an econometrician, who faces estimation and inference
problems that the agents in the model have somehow solved” (p. 3, emphasis in original).1
Researchers have proposed reﬁnements to rational expectations that respect the principle
that agents use information eﬃciently in forming expectations, but nonetheless recognize
the limits to and costs of information-processing and cognitive constraints that inﬂuence the
expectations-formation process (Sargent 1999, Evans and Honkapohja 2001, Sims 2003).
In this study, we allow for a form of imperfect knowledge in which economic agents
rely on an adaptive learning technology to form expectations. This form of learning rep-
resents a relatively modest deviation from rational expectations that nests it as a limiting
case. We show that the resulting process of perpetual learning introduces an additional
layer of interaction between monetary policy and economic outcomes that has important
implications for macroeconomic dynamics and for monetary policy design. As we illustrate,
monetary policies that would be eﬃcient under rational expectations can perform poorly
when knowledge is imperfect. In particular, with imperfect knowledge, policies that fail to
maintain tight control over inﬂation are prone to episodes in which the public’s expectations
of inﬂation become uncoupled from the policy objective. The presence of this imperfection
makes stabilization policy more diﬃcult than would appear under rational expectations and
1Missing from such models, as Benjamin Friedman (1979) points out, “is a clear outline of the way in
which economic agents derive the knowledge which they then use to formulate expectations.” To be sure,
this does not constitute a criticism of the traditional use of the concept of “rationality” as reﬂecting the
optimal use of information in the formation of expectations, taking into account an agent’s objectives and
resource constraints. The diﬃculty is that in Muth’s (1961) original formulation, rational expectations are
not optimizing in that sense. Thus, the issue is not that the “rational expectations” concept reﬂects too
much rationality but rather that it imposes too little rationality in the expectations formation process.
For example, as Sims (2003) has pointed out, optimal information processing subject to a ﬁnite cognitive
capacity may result in fundamentally diﬀerent processes for the formation of expectations from those implied
by rational expectations. To acknowledge this terminological tension, Simon (1978) suggested that a less
misleading term for Muth’s concept would be “model consistent” expectations (p. 2).
1highlights the value of eﬀectively communicating a central bank’s inﬂation objective and
of continued vigilance against inﬂation in anchoring inﬂation expectations and fostering
macroeconomic stability.
In this paper, we investigate the macroeconomic implications of a process of “perpetual
learning.” Our work builds on the extensive literature relating rational expectations with
learning and the adaptive formation of expectations (Bray 1982, Bray and Savin 1984,
Marcet and Sargent 1989, Woodford, 1990, Bullard and Mitra 2002). A key ﬁnding in
this literature is that under certain conditions an economy with learning converges to the
rational expectations equilibrium (Townsend 1978, Bray 1982, 1983, Blume and Easley
1982). However, until agents have accumulated suﬃcient knowledge about the economy,
economic outcomes during the transition depend on the adaptive learning process (Lucas
1986). Moreover, in a changing economic environment, agents are constantly learning and
their beliefs converge not to a ﬁxed rational expectations equilibrium, but to an ergodic
distribution around it (Sargent 1999, Evans and Honkapohja 2001).2
As a laboratory for our experiment, we employ a simple linear model of the U.S. economy
with characteristics similar to more elaborate models frequently used to study optimal mon-
etary policy. We assume that economic agents know the correct structure of the economy
and form expectations accordingly. But, rather than endowing them with complete knowl-
edge of the parameters of these functions—as would be required by imposing the rational
expectations assumption—we posit that economic agents rely on ﬁnite memory least squares
estimation to update these parameter estimates. This setting conveniently nests rational
expectations as the limiting case corresponding to inﬁnite memory least squares estimation
and allows varying degrees of imperfection in expectations formation to be characterized by
variation in a single model parameter.
We ﬁnd that even marginal deviations from rational expectations in the direction of
2Our work also draws on some other strands of the literature related to learning, estimation, and policy
design. One such strand has examined the formation of inﬂation expectations when the policymaker’s
objective may be unknown or uncertain, for example during a transition following a shift in policy regime
(Taylor 1975, Bomﬁm et al, 1997, Erceg and Levin, 2003, Kozicki and Tinsley, 2001, Tetlow and von zur
Muehlen 2001). Another strand has considered how policymaker uncertainty about the structure of the
economy inﬂuences policy choices and economic dynamics (Balvers and Cosimano 1994, Wieland 1998,
Sargent 1999, and others). Finally, our work relates to explorations of alternative approaches for modeling
aggregate inﬂation expectations, such as Ball (2000), Carroll (2003), and Mankiw and Reis (2002).
2imperfect knowledge can have economically important eﬀects on the stochastic behavior
of our economy and policy evaluation. An interesting feature of the model is that the
interaction of learning and control creates rich nonlinear dynamics that can potentially
explain both the shifting parameter structure of linear reduced form characterizations of
the economy and the appearance of shifting policy objectives or inﬂation targets. For
example, sequences of policy errors or inﬂationary shocks, such as experienced during the
1970s, could give rise to stagﬂationary episodes that do not arise under rational expectations
with perfect knowledge.
Indeed, the critical role of the formation of inﬂation expectations for understanding the
successes and failures of monetary policy is a dimension of policy that has often been cited
by policymakers over the past two decades but that has received much less attention in
formal econometric policy evaluations. An important example is the contrast between the
stubborn persistence of inﬂation expectations during the 1970s when policy placed relatively
greater attention on countercyclical concerns and the much improved stability in both inﬂa-
tion and inﬂation expectations following the renewed emphasis on price stability in 1979. In
explaining the rationale for this shift in emphasis in 1979, Federal Reserve Chairman Vol-
cker highlighted the importance of learning in shaping the inﬂation expectations formation
process:3
It is not necessary to recite all the details of the long series of events that have
culminated in the serious inﬂationary environment that we are now experiencing.
An entire generation of young adults has grown up since the mid-1960’s knowing
only inﬂation, indeed an inﬂation that has seemed to accelerate inexorably. In
the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that many citizens have begun to
wonder whether it is realistic to anticipate a return to general price stability,
and have begun to change their behavior accordingly. Inﬂation feeds in part
on itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive
economy must be to break the grip of inﬂationary expectations.
(Volcker 1979, p. 888)
This historical episode is a clear example of inﬂation expectations becoming uncoupled from
3Indeed, we would argue that the shift in emphasis towards greater focus on inﬂation was itself inﬂuenced
by the recognition of the importance of facilitating the formation of stable inﬂation expectations—which
had been insuﬃciently appreciated earlier during the 1970s. See Orphanides (2003a) for a more detailed
description of the policy discussion at the time and the nature of the improvement in monetary policy since
1979. See also Christiano and Gust (2000) and Sargent (1999) for alternative explanations of the rise in
inﬂation during the 1960s and 1970s.
3the intended policy objective and illustrates the point that the design of monetary policy
must account for the inﬂuence of policy on expectations.
We ﬁnd that policies designed to be eﬃcient under rational expectations can perform
very poorly when knowledge is imperfect. This deterioration in performance is particularly
severe when policymakers put a high weight on stabilizing real economic activity relative to
price stability. Our analysis yields two conclusions for the conduct of monetary policy when
knowledge is imperfect. First, policies that emphasize tight inﬂation control can facilitate
learning and provide better guidance for the formation of inﬂation expectations. Second,
eﬀective communication of an explicit numerical inﬂation target can help focus inﬂation
expectations and thereby reduce the costs associated with imperfect knowledge. Policies
that combine vigilance against inﬂation with an explicit numerical inﬂation target mitigate
the negative inﬂuence of imperfect knowledge on economic stabilization and yield superior
macroeconomic performance. Thus, our ﬁndings provide analytical support for monetary
policy frameworks that emphasize the primacy of price stability as an operational policy
objective, for example, the inﬂation targeting approach discussed by Bernanke and Mishkin
(1997) and adopted by several central banks over the past decade or so.
2 The Model Economy
We consider a stylized model that gives rise to a nontrivial inﬂation-output variability
tradeoﬀ and in which a simple one-parameter policy rule represents optimal monetary pol-
icy under rational expectations.4 In this section, we describe the model speciﬁcation for
inﬂation and output and the central bank’s optimization problem; in the next two sections,
we take up the formation of expectations by private agents.
Inﬂation is determined by a modiﬁed Lucas supply function that allows for some intrinsic
inﬂation persistence,
¼t+1 = Á¼e
t+1 + (1 ¡ Á)¼t + ®yt+1 + et+1; e » iid(0;¾2
e); (1)
where ¼ denotes the inﬂation rate, ¼e is the private agents’ expected inﬂation rate based on
4Since its introduction by Taylor (1979), the practice of analyzing monetary policy rules using such an
inﬂation-output variability tradeoﬀ has been adopted in a large number of academic and policy studies.
4time t information, y is the output gap, Á 2 (0;1), ® > 0, and e is a serially uncorrelated
innovation. As discussed by Clark, Goodhart, and Huang (1999) and Lengwiler and Or-
phanides (2002), this speciﬁcation incorporates an important role for inﬂation expectations
for determining inﬂation outcomes while also allowing for some inﬂation persistence that is
necessary for the model to yield a nontrivial inﬂation-output gap variability tradeoﬀ.5
We assume that the policymaker can set policy during period t so as to determine the
intended level of the output gap for period t + 1, xt, subject to a control error, ut+1,
yt+1 = xt + ut+1 u » iid(0;¾2
u): (2)
This is equivalent to assuming that the intended output gap for period t + 1 is determined
by the real rate gap set during period t, xt = ¡»(rt ¡ r¤), where r is the short-term real
interest rate, and r¤ is the equilibrium real rate.6 As will become clear, with this assumption
the model has the property that under perfect knowledge both the optimal policy rule and
the optimal inﬂation forecast rule can be written in terms of a single state variable, the
lagged inﬂation rate. This facilitates our analysis. Inﬂation expectations are fundamentally
anchored by monetary policy, while output expectations are anchored by views of aggregate
supply that are presumably less inﬂuenced by monetary policy. For this reason, we focus
on the interaction between monetary policy and inﬂation expectations.
The central bank’s objective is to design a policy rule that minimizes the loss, denoted
by L, equal to the weighted average of the asymptotic variances of the output gap and of
deviations of inﬂation from the target rate,
L = (1 ¡ !)V ar(y) + !V ar(¼ ¡ ¼¤); (3)
where V ar(z) denotes the unconditional variance of variable z, and ! 2 (0;1] is the relative
weight on inﬂation stabilization. This completes the description of the structure of the
5We have also examined the “New-Keynesian” variant of the Phillips curve studied by Gali and Gertler
(1999) and others, which also allows for some intrinsic inﬂation inertia. As we report in section 6, our main
ﬁndings are not sensitive to this alternative.
6Note, however, that this abstracts from the important complications associated with the real-time mea-
surement of the output gap and and the equilibrium real interest rate for formulating the policy rule. See
Orphanides (2003b), Laubach and Williams (2003), and Orphanides and Williams (2002) for analyses of
these issues.
5model economy, with the exception of the expectations formation process that we examine
in detail below.
3 The Perfect Knowledge Benchmark
We begin by considering the “textbook” case of rational expectations with perfect knowl-
edge in which private agents know both the structure of the economy and the central bank’s
policy. In this case, expectations are rational in that they are consistent with the true data
generating process of the economy (the model). In the next section, we use the result-
ing equilibrium solution as a “perfect knowledge” benchmark against which we compare
outcomes under imperfect knowledge, in which case agents do not know the structural pa-
rameters of the model but instead must form expectations based on estimated forecasting
models.
Under the assumption of perfect knowledge, both the evolution of the economy and
optimal monetary policy can be expressed in terms of two variables, the current inﬂation
rate and its target level. These variables determine the formation of expectations and
the policy choice, which, together with serially uncorrelated shocks, determine output and
inﬂation in period t+1. Speciﬁcally, we can write the monetary policy rule in terms of the
inﬂation gap,
xt = ¡µ(¼t ¡ ¼¤); (4)
where µ > 0 measures the responsiveness of the intended output gap to the inﬂation gap.
Given this monetary policy rule, inﬂation expectations are:
¼e
t+1 =
®µ
1 ¡ Á
¼¤ +
1 ¡ Á ¡ ®µ
1 ¡ Á
¼t: (5)
Inﬂation expectations depend on the current level of inﬂation, the inﬂation target, and the
parameter µ measuring the central bank’s responsiveness to the inﬂation gap. Substituting
this expression for expected inﬂation into equation (1) yields the rational expectations
solution for inﬂation for a given monetary policy,
¼t+1 =
®µ
1 ¡ Á
¼¤ + (1 ¡
®µ
1 ¡ Á
)¼t + et+1 + ®ut+1: (6)
6One noteworthy feature of this solution is that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of the inﬂation
rate, given by 1 ¡ ®µ
1¡Á, is decreasing in µ and is invariant to the value of ¼¤. Note that the
rational expectations solution can also be written in terms of the “inﬂation expectations
gap”—the diﬀerence between inﬂation expectations for period t+1 from the inﬂation target,
¼e
t+1 ¡ ¼¤
t,
¼e
t+1 ¡ ¼¤
t =
1 ¡ Á ¡ ®µ
1 ¡ Á
(¼t ¡ ¼¤): (7)
Equations (4) and (5) close the perfect knowledge benchmark model.
3.1 Optimal Monetary Policy under Perfect Knowledge
For the economy with perfect knowledge, the optimal monetary policy, µP, can be obtained
in closed form and is given by:7
µP =
!
2 (1 ¡ !)
0
@¡
®
1 ¡ Á
+
sµ
®
1 ¡ Á
¶2
+
4 (1 ¡ !)
!
1
A for 0 < ! < 1: (8)
In the limit, when ! equals unity (that is, when the policymaker is not at all concerned with
output stability), the policymaker sets the real interest rate so that inﬂation is expected
to return to its target in the next period. The optimal policy in the case ! = 1 is given
by: µP =
1¡Á
® , and the irreducible variance of inﬂation, owing to unpredictable output and
inﬂation innovations, equals ¾2
e + ®2¾2
u. More generally, the optimal value of µ depends
positively on the ratio
1¡Á
® , and the parameters ® and Á enter only in terms of this ratio.
In particular, the optimal policy response is larger the greater the degree of intrinsic inertia
in inﬂation, measured by 1 ¡ Á.
The greater the central bank’s weight on inﬂation stabilization, the greater is the re-
sponsiveness to the inﬂation gap and the smaller the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in inﬂation.
Diﬀerentiating equation (8) shows that the policy responsiveness to the inﬂation gap is in-
creasing in !, the weight the central bank places on inﬂation stabilization. As a result, the
7The optimal policy can be described in terms of the Euler equation that relates the intended output gap
to the inﬂation rate and one the intended output gap expected in the next period:
xt = Et¡1
½
xt+1 ¡
!
1 ¡ !
®
1 ¡ Á
¼t+1
¾
:
Under the assumption of serially uncorrelated shocks, the solution simpliﬁes to the expression given in the
text.
7autocorrelation of inﬂation is decreasing in !, with a limiting value approaching unity when
! approaches zero, and zero when ! equals one. That is, if the central bank cares only
about output stabilization, the inﬂation rate becomes a random walk, while if the central
bank cares only about inﬂation stabilization, the inﬂation rate displays no serial correlation.
And, as noted, this model yields a nontrivial monotonic tradeoﬀ between the variability of
inﬂation and the output gap for all values of ! 2 (0;1]. These results are illustrated in
Figure 1. The top panel of the ﬁgure shows the variability tradeoﬀ described by optimal
policies for values of ! between zero and one. The lower panel plots the optimal values of
µ against !.
4 Imperfect Knowledge
As the perfect knowledge solution shows, private inﬂation forecasts depend on knowledge
of the structural model parameters and of policymaker preferences. In addition, these
parameters inﬂuence the expectations formation function nonlinearly. We now relax the
assumption that private agents have perfect knowledge of all structural parameters and
policymaker preferences. Instead, we posit that agents must somehow infer the informa-
tion necessary for forming expectations by observing historical data, in essence acting like
econometricians who know the correct speciﬁcation of the economy but are uncertain about
the parameters of the model.
In particular, we assume that private agents update the coeﬃcients of their model for
forecasting inﬂation using least squares learning with ﬁnite memory. We focus on least
squares learning because of its desirable convergence properties, straightforward implemen-
tation, and close correspondence to what real-world forecasters actually do.8 Estimation
with ﬁnite memory reﬂects agents’ concern for changes in the structural parameters of the
8This method of adaptive learning is closely related to optimal ﬁltering, where the structural parameters
are assumed to follow random walks. Of course, if private agents know the complete structure of the model—
including the laws of motion for inﬂation, output, and the unobserved states and the distributions of the
innovations to these processes—then they could compute eﬃcient inﬂation forecasts that could outperform
those based on recursive least squares. However, uncertainty regarding the precise structure of the time
variation in the model parameters is likely to reduce the real eﬃciency gains from a method optimized to a
particular model speciﬁcation relative to a simple method such as least-squares learning. Further, once we
begin to ponder how economic agents could realistically model and account for such uncertainty precisely, we
quickly recognize the signiﬁcance of respecting (or the absurdity of ignoring) the cognitive and computational
limits of economic agents.
8economy. To focus our attention on the role of imperfections in the expectations formation
process itself, however, we deliberately abstract from the introduction of the actual uncer-
tainty in the structure of the economy which would justify such concerns in equilibrium.
Further, we do not model the policymaker’s knowledge or learning, but instead focus on the
implications of policy based on simple time-invariant rules of the form given in equation (4)
that do not require explicit treatment of the policymaker’s learning problem.9
We model perpetual learning by assuming that agents use a constant gain in their
recursive least squares formula that places greater weight on more recent observations,
as in Sargent (1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001). This algorithm is equivalent to
applying weighted least squares where the weights decline geometrically with the distance
in time between the observation being weighted and the most recent observation. This
approach is closely related to the use of ﬁxed sample lengths or rolling-window regressions
to estimate a forecasting model (Friedman 1979). In terms of the mean “age” of the data
used, a rolling-regression window of length l is equivalent to a constant gain · of 2=l. The
advantage of the constant gain least squares algorithm over rolling regressions is that the
evolution of the former system is fully described by a small set of variables, while the latter
requires one to keep track of a large number of variables.
4.1 Least Squares Learning with Finite Memory
Under perfect knowledge, the predictable component of next period’s inﬂation rate is a linear
function of the inﬂation target and the current inﬂation rate, where the coeﬃcients on the
two variables are functions of the policy parameter µ and the other structural parameters
of the model, as shown in equation (5). In addition, the optimal value of µ is itself a
nonlinear function of the central bank’s weight on inﬂation stabilization and the other
model structural parameters. Given this simple structure, the least squares regression of
inﬂation on a constant and lagged inﬂation,
¼i = c0;t + c1;t¼i¡1 + vi; (9)
9We also abstract from two other elements that may further complicate policy design: The possibilities
that policymakers may rely on a misspeciﬁed model or a misspeciﬁed information set for computing agent’s
expectations; see, Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003) and Orphanides (2003b), respectively, for a discussion
of these two issues.
9yields consistent estimates of the coeﬃcients describing the law of motion for inﬂation
(Marcet and Sargent 1988 and Evans and Honkapohja 2001). Agents then use these results
to form their inﬂation expectations.10
To ﬁx notation, let Xi and ci be the 2 £ 1 vectors Xi = (1;¼i¡1)0 and ci = (c0;i;c1;i)0.
Using data through period t, the least squares regression parameters for equation (9) can
be written in recursive form:
ct = ct¡1 + ·tR¡1
t Xt(¼t ¡ X0
tct¡1); (10)
Rt = Rt¡1 + ·t(XtX0
t ¡ Rt¡1); (11)
where ·t is the gain. With least squares learning with inﬁnite memory, ·t = 1=t, so as
t increases, ·t converges to zero. As a result, as the data accumulate this mechanism
converges to the correct expectations functions and the economy converges to the perfect
knowledge benchmark solution. As noted above, to formalize perpetual learning—as would
be required in the presence of structural change—we replace the decreasing gain in the
inﬁnite memory recursion with a small constant gain, · > 0.11
With imperfect knowledge, expectations are based on the perceived law of motion of
the inﬂation process, governed by the perpetual learning algorithm described above. The
model under imperfect knowledge consists of the structural equation for inﬂation (1), the
output gap equation (2), the monetary policy rule (4), and the one-step-ahead forecast for
inﬂation, given by
¼e
t+1 = c0;t + c1;t¼t; (12)
where c0;t and c1;t are updated according to equations (10) and (11).
We emphasize that in the limit of perfect knowledge (that is, as · ! 0), the expectations
function above converges to rational expectations and the stochastic coeﬃcients for the
10Note that here we assume that agents employ a reduced form of the expectations formation function
that is correctly speciﬁed under rational expectations with perfect knowledge. However, agents may be
uncertain of the correct form and estimate a more general speciﬁcation, for example, a linear regression with
additional lags of inﬂation which nests (9). In section 6, we also discuss results from such an example.
11In terms of forecasting performance, the “optimal” choice of · depends on the relative variances of the
transitory and permanent shocks, as in the relationship between the Kalman gain and the signal-to-noise
ratio in the case of the Kalman ﬁlter. Here, we do not explicitly attempt to calibrate · in this way, but
instead examine the eﬀects for a range of values of ·.
10intercept and slope collapse to:
cP
0 =
®µ¼¤
1 ¡ Á
;
cP
1 =
1 ¡ Á ¡ ®µ
1 ¡ Á
:
Thus, this modeling approach accommodates the Lucas critique in the sense that expec-
tations formation is endogenous and adjusts to changes in policy or structure (as reﬂected
here by changes in the parameters µ, ¼¤, ®, and Á). In essence, our model is one of “noisy ra-
tional expectations.” As we show below, although expectations are imperfectly rational, in
that agents need to estimate the reduced form equations they employ to form expectations,
they are nearly rational, in that the forecasts are close to being eﬃcient.
5 Perpetual Learning in Action
We use model simulations to illustrate how learning aﬀects the dynamics of inﬂation ex-
pectations, inﬂation, and output in the model economy. First, we examine the behavior of
the estimated coeﬃcients of the inﬂation forecast equation and evaluate the performance of
inﬂation forecasts. We then consider the dynamic response of the economy to shocks sim-
ilar to those experienced during the 1970s in the United States. Speciﬁcally, we compare
the outcomes under perfect knowledge and imperfect knowledge with least squares learn-
ing that correspond to three alternative monetary policy rules to illustrate the additional
layer of dynamic interaction introduced by the imperfections in the formation of inﬂation
expectations.
In calibrating the model for the simulations, each period corresponds to about half a
year. We consider values of · of 0.025, 0.05, and 0.075, which roughly correspond to using
40, 20, or 13 years of data, respectively, in the context of rolling regressions. We consider
two values for Á, the parameter that measures the inﬂuence of inﬂation expectations on
inﬂation. As a baseline case, we set Á to 0.75, which implies a signiﬁcant role for intrinsic
inﬂation inertia, consistent with the contracting models of Buiter and Jewitt (1981), and
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), and Brayton, et al. (1997).12 In the alternative speciﬁcation, we
12Other researchers suggest an even smaller role for expectations relative to intrinsic inertia; see Fuhrer
(1997), Roberts (2001), and Rudd and Whelan (2001).
11allow for a greater role for expectations and correspondingly give less weight to inﬂation
inertia by setting Á = 0:9, consistent with the ﬁndings of Gali and Gertler (1999) and others.
To ease comparisons between the two values of Á, we set ® so that the optimal policy under
perfect knowledge is identical in the two cases. Speciﬁcally, for Á = 0:75, we set ® = 0:25,
and for Á = 0:9, we set ® = 0:1. In all cases, we assume ¾e = ¾u = 1.
The three alternative policies we consider correspond to the values of µ, f0:1;0:6;1:0g,
which represent the optimal policies under perfect knowledge for policymakers whose pref-
erences reﬂect a relative weight on inﬂation, !, of 0.01, 0.5, and 1, respectively. Hence,
µ = 0:1 corresponds to an “inﬂation dove” policymaker who is primarily concerned about
output stabilization, µ = 0:6 corresponds to a policymaker with “balanced preferences” who
weighs inﬂation and output stabilization equally, and µ = 1 corresponds to an “inﬂation
hawk” policymaker who cares exclusively about inﬂation.
5.1 The Performance of Least-Squares Inﬂation Forecasts
Even absent shocks to the structure of the economy, the process of least squares learn-
ing generates time variation in the formation of inﬂation expectations and thereby in the
processes of inﬂation and output. The magnitude of this time variation is increasing in ·—
which is equivalent to using shorter samples (and thus less information from the historical
data) in rolling regressions. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the estimates of agents’
inﬂation forecasting model based on stochastic simulations of the model economy for the
two calibrations we consider. As seen in the table, the unconditional standard deviations
of the estimates increase with ·. This dependence of the variation in the estimates on the
rate of learning is portrayed in Figure 2, which shows the steady-state distributions of the
estimates of c0 and c1 for the case of Á0:75. For comparison, the vertical lines in each panel
indicate the values of c0 and c1 in the corresponding perfect knowledge benchmark.
The median values of the coeﬃcient estimates are nearly identical to the values implied
by the perfect knowledge benchmark; however, the mean estimates of c1 are biased down-
ward slightly. Although not shown in the table, the mean and median values of c0 are
nearly zero, consistent with the assumed inﬂation target of zero. There is contemporaneous
correlation between estimates of c0 and c1 is nearly zero. Each of these estimates, however,
12Table 1: Least Squares Learning
RE Á = 0:75;® = 0:25 Á = 0:90;® = 0:10
·: 0 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.025 0.050 0.075
µ = 0:1
Mean c1 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.88 0.89 0.93
Median c1 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.97 0.98
SD c0 – 0.37 0.67 1.01 0.79 2.06 4.92
SD c1 – 0.12 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.20
µ = 0:6
Mean c1 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.33
Median c1 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.40 0.41 0.42
SD c0 – 0.25 0.38 0.50 0.40 0.66 0.91
SD c1 – 0.20 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.42 0.50
µ = 1:0
Mean c1 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
Median c1 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06
SD c0 – 0.24 0.35 0.44 0.37 0.58 0.74
SD c1 – 0.21 0.29 0.35 0.33 0.44 0.51
is highly serially correlated, with ﬁrst-order autocorrelations just below unity. This serial
correlation falls only slightly as · increases.
Note that a more aggressive policy response to inﬂation reduces the variation in the
estimated intercept, c0, but increases the magnitude of ﬂuctuations in the coeﬃcient on the
lagged inﬂation rate, c1. In the case of µ = 1, the distribution of estimates of c1 is nearly
symmetrical around zero. For µ = 0:1 and 0:6, the distribution of estimates of c1 is skewed
to the left, reﬂecting the accumulation of mass around unity, but the absence of much mass
above 1.1.
Finite-memory least squares forecasts perform very well in this model economy. As
shown in Table 2, the mean-squared error of agents’ one-step-ahead inﬂation forecasts is
only slightly above the theoretical minimum given in the ﬁrst line of the table (labeled “Per-
fect knowledge”).13 Only when both inﬂation displays very little intrinsic inertia and the
policymaker places very little weight on inﬂation stabilization does the performance of ﬁnite-
13This is consistent with earlier ﬁndings regarding least squares estimation. Anderson and Taylor (1976),
for example, emphasize that least squares forecasts can be accurate even when consistent estimates of
individual parameter estimates are much harder to obtain.
13Table 2: Forecasting Performance: Mean-squared Error
Á = 0:75;® = 0:25 Á = 0:90;® = 0:10
Forecast method · : 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.025 0.050 0.075
Perfect knowledge 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.01
µ = 0:1
LS (ﬁnite memory) 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.03 1.19 1.57
LS (inﬁnite memory) 1.05 1.06 1.09 1.08 1.72 3.49
Long-lag Phillips curve 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.08 1.11
µ = 0:6
LS (ﬁnite memory) 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.01 1.01 1.02
LS (inﬁnite memory) 1.06 1.09 1.12 1.10 1.20 1.31
Long-lag Phillips curve 1.05 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.11 1.17
µ = 1:0
LS (ﬁnite memory) 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.01 1.01 1.02
LS (inﬁnite memory) 1.06 1.10 1.14 1.12 1.28 1.51
Long-lag Phillips curve 1.05 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.12 1.18
memory least squares forecasts break down. Not surprisingly, given that we assume that
the structure of the economy is ﬁxed, agents’ forecasting performance deteriorates some-
what as · increases. Nonetheless, ﬁnite-memory least squares estimates perform better than
those with inﬁnite memory (based on the full sample), and the diﬀerence in performance is
more pronounced the greater the role of inﬂation expectations in determining inﬂation. In
an economy where inﬂation is determined by the forecasts of other agents who use ﬁnite-
memory least squares, it is better to follow suit rather than to use estimates that would
have better forecast properties under perfect knowledge (Evans and Ramey 2001).
With imperfect knowledge, the private agents ability to forecast inﬂation depends on the
monetary policy in place, with forecast errors on average smaller when policy responds more
aggressively to inﬂation. This eﬀect is more pronounced the greater the role of inﬂation
expectations in determining inﬂation. The marginal beneﬁt from tighter inﬂation control on
the ability of private agents to forecast accurately is greatest when the policymaker places
relatively little weight on inﬂation stabilization. In this case, inﬂation is highly serially
correlated, and the estimates of c1 are frequently in the vicinity of unity. Evidently, the
14ability to forecast inﬂation deteriorates when inﬂation is nearly a random walk. As seen
by comparing the cases of µ of 0.6 and 1.0, the marginal beneﬁt of tight inﬂation control
disappears once the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of inﬂation is well below one.
Finally, even though only one lag of inﬂation appears in the equations for inﬂation and
inﬂation expectations, it is possible to improve on inﬁnite-memory least squares forecasts
by including additional lags of inﬂation in the estimated forecasting equation. This result is
similar to that found in empirical studies of inﬂation, where relatively long lags of inﬂation
help predict inﬂation (Staiger, Stock, and Watson 1997, Stock and Watson 1999, Brayton,
Roberts, and Williams 1999). Evidently, in an economy where agents use adaptive learning,
multi-period lags of inﬂation are a reasonable proxy for inﬂation expectations. This result
may also help explain the ﬁnding that survey-based inﬂation expectations do not appear to
be “rational” using standard tests (Roberts 1997, 1998). With adaptive learning, inﬂation
forecast errors are correlated with data in the agents’ information set; the standard test for
forecast eﬃciency applies only to stable economic environments in which agents’ estimates
of the forecast model have converged to the true values.
5.2 Least Squares Learning and Inﬂation Persistence
The time variation in inﬂation expectations resulting from perpetual learning induces greater
serial correlation in inﬂation. As shown in Table 3, the ﬁrst-order unconditional autocorre-
lation of inﬂation increases with ·. The ﬁrst column shows the autocorrelations for inﬂation
under perfect knowledge (· = 0); note that these ﬁgures are identical across the two speci-
ﬁcations of Á and ®. In the case of the “inﬂation dove” policymaker (µ = 0:1), the existence
of learning raises the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation from 0.9 to very nearly unity. For the
policymaker with moderate preferences (µ = 0:6), increasing · from 0 to 0.075 causes the
autocorrelation of inﬂation to rise from 0.40 to 0.60 when Á = 0:75, or to 0.88 when Á = 0:9.
Thus, in a model with a relatively small amount of intrinsic inﬂation persistence, the
autocorrelation of inﬂation can be very high, even with a monetary policy that places sig-
niﬁcant weight on inﬂation stabilization. Even for the “inﬂation hawk” policymaker whose
policy under perfect knowledge results in no serial persistence in inﬂation, the perpetual
learning generates a signiﬁcant amount of positive serial correlation in inﬂation. As we
15Table 3: Inﬂation Persistence: First-order Autocorrelation
Á = 0:75;® = 0:25 Á = 0:90;® = 0:10
µ ·: 0 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.025 0.050 0.075
0.1 0.90 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.6 0.40 0.47 0.54 0.60 0.61 0.78 0.88
1.0 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.18 0.25
discuss below, the rise in inﬂation persistence associated with perpetual learning in turn
aﬀects the optimal design of monetary policy.
5.3 The Economy Following Inﬂationary Shocks
Next, we consider the dynamic response of the model to a sequence of unanticipated shocks,
similar in spirit to those that arose in the 1970s. The responses of inﬂation expectations and
inﬂation do not depend on the “source” of the shocks, that is, on whether we assume the
shocks are due to policy errors or to other disturbances.14 The conﬁguration of shocks we
have in mind would not be expected to occur frequently, of course. It is, however, instructive
in that it illustrates how in these infrequent episodes the evolution of inﬂation expectations
with learning could dramatically deviate from the perfect knowledge benchmark under
some policies. Inﬂation expectations in these episodes can become uncoupled from the
policymakers’ objectives, resulting in a period of stagﬂation that cannot occur under the
perfect knowledge benchmark.
Note that under least squares learning, the model responses depend nonlinearly on
the initial values of the states c and R. In the following, we report the average response
from 1000 simulations, each of which starts from initial conditions drawn from the relevant
steady-state distribution. The shock is 2 percentage points in period one and it declines in
magnitude from periods two through eight. In period nine and beyond there is no shock.
For these experiments we assume the baseline values for Á and ®, and set · = 0.05.
With perfect knowledge, the series of inﬂationary shocks causes a temporary rise in
14The policy error we have in mind is the systematic misperception of the economy’s non-inﬂationary
potential supply following an unobserved shift in potential output growth or an increase in the natural rate
of unemployment, as apparently experienced in the 1970s. (See, for example, Orphanides and Williams,
2002, and Orphanides, 2003c.) Because such changes can only be perceived with the passage of time, they
yield errors that are recognized to be serially correlated only in retrospect. In our model, the eﬀect of such
errors on inﬂation dynamics is isomorphic to that of an exogenous serially correlated inﬂation shock.
16inﬂation and a decline in the output gap, as shown by the dashed lines in Figure 3. The
speed at which inﬂation is brought back to target depends on the monetary policy response,
with the more aggressive policy yielding a relatively sharp but short decline in output and
a rapid return of inﬂation to target. With the inﬂation hawk or moderate policymaker, the
peak increase in inﬂation is no more than 2-1/2 percentage points and inﬂation returns to its
target within 10 periods. With the inﬂation dove policymaker, the modest policy response
avoids the sharp decline in output, but inﬂation is allowed to rise to a level about 4-1/2
percentage points above target, and the return to target is more gradual, with inﬂation still
remaining one percentage point above target after 20 periods.
Imperfect knowledge with learning ampliﬁes and prolongs the response of inﬂation and
output to the shocks, especially when the central bank places signiﬁcant weight on output
stabilization. The solid lines in the ﬁgure show the responses of inﬂation and output under
imperfect knowledge for the three policy rules. The inﬂation hawk’s aggressive response
to inﬂation eﬀectively keeps inﬂation from drifting away from target and the responses of
inﬂation and output diﬀer only modestly from those under perfect knowledge. In the case of
balanced preferences, the magnitude of the peak responses of inﬂation and the output gap
is a bit larger than under perfect knowledge, but the persistence of these gaps is markedly
higher. The outcomes under the inﬂation dove, however, are dramatically diﬀerent. The
inﬂation dove attempts to ﬁnesse a gradual reduction in inﬂation without incurring a large
decline in output, but the timid response to rising inﬂation causes the perceived process for
inﬂation to become uncoupled from the policymaker’s objectives. Stagﬂation results, with
the inﬂation rate stuck over 8 percentage points above target, while output remains well
below potential.
The striking diﬀerences in the responses to the shocks under imperfect knowledge are a
product of the interaction between learning, the policy rule, and inﬂation expectations. The
solid lines in Figure 4 show the responses of the public’s estimates of the intercept and the
slope parameter of the inﬂation forecasting equation under imperfect knowledge. Under the
inﬂation hawk policymaker, inﬂation expectations are well anchored to the policy objective.
The serially correlated inﬂationary shocks cause some increase in both estimates, but the
17implied increase in the inﬂation target peaks at only 0.3 percentage point (not shown in the
ﬁgure). Even for the moderate policymaker who accommodates some of the inﬂationary
shock for a time, the perceived inﬂation target rises by just one-half percentage point.
In contrast, under the inﬂation dove policymaker, the estimated persistence of inﬂation,
already very high owing to the policymaker’s desire to minimize output ﬂuctuations while
responding to inﬂation shocks, rises steadily, approaching unity. With inﬂation temporarily
perceived to be a near-random walk with positive drift, agents expect inﬂation to continue
to rise. The policymaker’s attempts to constrain inﬂation are too weak to counteract this
adverse expectations process, and the public’s perception of the inﬂation target rises by 5
percentage points. Despite the best of intents, the gradual disinﬂation prescription that
would be optimal with perfect knowledge yields stagﬂation—the simultaneous occurrence
of persistently high inﬂation and low output.
Interestingly, the inﬂation dove simulation appears to capture some key characteristics
of the United States economy at the end of the 1970s, and it accords well with Chairman
Volcker’s assessment of the economic situation at the time:
Moreover, inﬂationary expectations are now deeply embedded in public atti-
tudes, as reﬂected in the practices and policies of individuals and economic
institutions. After years of false starts in the eﬀort against inﬂation, there is
widespread skepticism about the prospects for success. Overcoming this legacy
of doubt is a critical challenge that must be met in shaping–and in carrying
out–all our policies.
Changing both expectations and actual price performance will be diﬃcult. But
it is essential if our economic future is to be secure.
(Volcker 1981, p. 293)
In contrast to this dismal experience, the model simulations suggest that the rise in inﬂation—
and the corresponding costs of disinﬂation—would have been much smaller if policy had
responded more aggressively to the inﬂationary developments of the 1970s. Although this
was apparently not recognized at the time, Chairman Volcker’s analysis suggests that the
stagﬂationary experience of the 1970s played a role in the subsequent recognition of the
value of continued vigilance against inﬂation in anchoring inﬂation expectations.
186 Imperfect Knowledge and Monetary Policy
6.1 Naive Application of the Rational Expectations Policy
We now turn to the design of eﬃcient monetary policy under imperfect knowledge. We start
by considering the experiment in which the policymaker sets policy under the assumption
that private agents have perfect knowledge when, in fact, they have only imperfect knowl-
edge and base their expectations on the perpetual learning mechanism described above.
That is, policy follows (4) with the response parameter, µ, computed using (8).
Figure 5 compares the variability pseudo-frontier corresponding to this equilibrium to
the frontier from the perfect knowledge benchmark. The top panel shows the outcomes in
terms of inﬂation and output gap variability with the baseline parameterization, Á = 0:75.
The bottom panel shows the results of the same experiment with the more forward-looking
speciﬁcation for inﬂation, Á = 0:9. In each case, we show the imperfect knowledge equilibria
corresponding to three diﬀerent values of ·.
With imperfect knowledge, the perpetual learning mechanism introduces random errors
in expectations formation, that is, deviations of expectations from the values that would
correspond to the same realization of inﬂation and the same policy rule. These errors are
costly for stabilization and are responsible for the deterioration in performance shown in
Figure 5.
This deterioration in performance is especially pronounced for the policymaker who
places relatively low weight on inﬂation stabilization. As seen in the simulations of the
inﬂationary shocks reported above, for such policies the time variation in the estimated au-
tocorrelation of inﬂation in the vicinity of unity associated with learning can be especially
costly. Furthermore, the deterioration in performance relative to the case of the perfect
knowledge benchmark is larger the greater is the role of expectations in determining inﬂa-
tion. With the higher value for Á, if a policymaker’s preference for inﬂation stabilization is
too low, the resulting outcomes under imperfect knowledge are strictly dominated by the
outcomes corresponding to the naive policy equilibrium for higher values of !.
196.2 Eﬃcient Simple Rule
Next we examine imperfect knowledge equilibria when the policymaker is aware of the im-
perfection in expectations formation and adjusts policy accordingly. To allow for a straight-
forward comparison with the perfect knowledge benchmark, we concentrate on the eﬃcient
choice of the responsiveness of policy to inﬂation, µS, in the simple linear rule:
xt = ¡µS(¼t ¡ ¼¤);
which has the same form as the optimal rule under the perfect knowledge benchmark.15
The eﬃcient policy response with imperfect knowledge is to be more vigilant against
inﬂation deviations from the policymaker’s target relative to the optimal response under
perfect knowledge. Figure 6 shows the eﬃcient choices for µ under imperfect knowledge
for the two model parameterizations; the optimal policy under perfect knowledge—which
is the same for the two parameterizations considered—is shown again for comparison. As
before, we present results for three diﬀerent values of ·, our baseline · = 0:05 and also a
smaller and a larger value. The increase in the eﬃcient value of µ is especially pronounced
when the policymaker places relatively little weight on inﬂation stabilization, that is, when
inﬂation would exhibit high serial correlation under perfect knowledge. Under imperfect
knowledge, it is eﬃcient for a policymaker to bias the response to inﬂation upward relative
to that implied by perfect knowledge. This eﬀect is especially pronounced with the more
forward-looking inﬂation process. Consider, for instance, the baseline case · = 0:05. In the
parameterization with Á = 0:9, it is never eﬃcient to set µ below 0.6, the value that one
would choose under balanced preferences (! = 0:5) under perfect knowledge.
Accounting for imperfect knowledge can signiﬁcantly improve stabilization performance
relative to outcomes obtained when the policymaker naively adopts policies that are eﬃcient
under perfect knowledge. Figure 7 compares the loss to the policymaker with perfect and
imperfect knowledge for diﬀerent preferences !. The top panel shows the outcomes for the
15In Orphanides and Williams (2003), we explore policies that respond directly to private expectations of
inﬂation, in addition to actual inﬂation. These rules are not fully optimal; with imperfect knowledge, the
fully optimal policy would be a nonlinear function of all the states of the system, including the elements of
c and R. However, implementation of such policies would assume the policymaker’s full knowledge of the
structure of the economy an assumption we ﬁnd untenable in practice.
20baseline parameterization, Á = 0:75;® = 0:25; the bottom panel reports the outcomes for
the alternative parameterization of inﬂation, Á = 0:9;® = 0:1. In both panels, the results we
show for imperfect knowledge correspond to our benchmark case, · = 0:05. The payoﬀ to
reoptimizing µ is largest for policymakers who place a large weight on output stabilization,
with the gain huge in the case of Á = 0:9. In contrast, the beneﬁts from reoptimization are
trivial for policymakers who are primarily concerned with inﬂation stabilization regardless
of Á.
The key ﬁnding that the public’s imperfect knowledge raises the eﬃcient policy response
to inﬂation is not unique to the model considered here and carries over to models with
alternative speciﬁcations. In particular, we ﬁnd the same result when the equation for
inﬂation is replaced with the “New Keynesian” variant studied by Gali and Gertler (1999)
(see also Gaspar and Smets 2002). Moreover, we ﬁnd that qualitatively similar results
obtain if agents include additional lags of inﬂation in their forecasting models.
6.3 Dissecting the Beneﬁts of Vigilance
In order to gain insight into the interaction of imperfections in the formation of expectations
and eﬃcient policy, we consider a simple example where the parameters of the inﬂation
forecast model vary according to an exogenous stochastic process.
From equation (5), recall that expectations formation is driven by the stochastic coeﬃ-
cient expectations function:
¼e
t+1 = c0;t + c1;t¼t: (13)
For the present purposes, let c0;t and c1;t vary relative to their perfect knowledge benchmark
values; i.e., c0;t = cP
0 + v0;t and c1;t = cP
1 + v1;t; where v0;t and v1;t are independent zero
mean normal distributions with variances ¾2
0 and ¾2
1.
Substituting expectations into the Phillips curve and rearranging terms results in the
following reduced form characterization of the dynamics of inﬂation in terms of the control
variable x:
¼t+1 = (1 + Áv1;t)¼t +
®
1 ¡ Á
xt + ®ut+1 + et+1 + Áv0;t: (14)
In this case, the optimal policy with stochastic coeﬃcients has the same linear structure
21as the optimal policy with ﬁxed coeﬃcients and perfect knowledge, and the optimal policy
response is monotonically increasing in the variance ¾2
1.16
Although informative, the simple case examined above ignores the important eﬀect of
the serial correlation in v0 and v1 that obtains under imperfect knowledge. The eﬃcient
choice of µ cannot be written in closed form in the case of serially correlated processes for v0
and v1, but a set of stochastic simulations is informative. Consider the eﬃcient choice of µ
for our benchmark economy with balanced preferences, ! = 0:5. Under perfect knowledge,
the optimal choice of µ is approximately 0.6. Instead, simulations assuming an exogenous
autoregressive process for either c0 or c1 with a variance and autocorrelation matching our
economy with imperfect knowledge suggest an eﬃcient choice of µ approximately equal to
0.7—regardless of whether the variation is due to c0 or to c1. For comparison, with the
endogenous variation in the parameters in the economy with learning, the eﬃcient choice
of µ is 0.75.
As noted earlier, for a ﬁxed policy choice of policy responsiveness in the policy rule, µ,
the uncertainty in the process of expectations formation with imperfect knowledge raises
the persistence of the inﬂation process relative to the perfect knowledge case. This can
be seen by comparing the solid and dashed lines in the two panels of Figure 8, which plot
the persistence of inﬂation when policy follows the RE-optimal rule and agents have perfect
and imperfect knowledge (with · = 0:05), respectively. This increase in inﬂation persistence
complicates stabilization eﬀorts as it raises, on average, the output costs associated with
restoring price stability when inﬂation deviates from its target.
The key beneﬁt of adopting greater vigilance against inﬂation deviations from the pol-
icymaker’s target in the presence of imperfect knowledge comes from reducing this excess
16See Turnovsky (1977) and Craine (1979) for early applications of the well-known optimal control results
for this case. For our model, speciﬁcally, the optimal response can be written as:
µ =
®(1 ¡ Á)s
(1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ !) + ®2s
;
where s is the positive root of the quadratic equation:
0 = !(1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ Á)
2 + (!®
2 + (1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ Á)
2Á
2¾
2
1)s + (Á
2¾
2
1 ¡ 1)®
2s
2:
While the optimal policy response to inﬂation deviations from target, µ, is independent of ¾
2
0, the variance
of the v0;t diﬀerentiation reveals that it is increasing in ¾
2
1, the variance of v1;t. As ¾
2
1 ! 0, of course, this
solution collapses to the optimal policy with perfect knowledge.
22serial persistence of inﬂation. More aggressive policies reduce the persistence of inﬂation,
thus facilitating its control. The resulting eﬃcient choice of reduction in inﬂation persistence
is reﬂected by the dash-dot lines in Figure 8.
7 Learning with a Known Inﬂation Target
Throughout the preceding discussion and analysis, we have implicitly assumed that agents
do not rely on explicit knowledge regarding the policymaker’s objectives in forming expec-
tations. Arguably, this assumption best describes situations where a central bank does not
successfully communicate to the public an explicit numerical inﬂation target and, perhaps,
a clear weighting of its price and economic stability objectives. Since the adoption and clear
communication of an explicit numerical inﬂation target is one of the key characteristics of
inﬂation targeting regimes, it is of interest to explore the implications of this dimension
of inﬂation targeting in our model. To do so, we consider the case where the policymaker
explicitly communicates the ultimate inﬂation target to the public; that is, we assume that
the public exactly knows the value of ¼¤ and explicitly incorporates this information in
forming inﬂation expectations. Of course, even in an explicit inﬂation targeting regime, the
public may remain somewhat uncertain regarding the policymaker’s inﬂation target, ¼¤, so
that this assumption of a perfectly known inﬂation target may not be obtainable in practice
and may be seen as an illustrative limiting case.
The assumption of a known numerical inﬂation target simpliﬁes the public’s inﬂation
forecasting problem. From equations (7) and (8), the reduced form equation for inﬂation
under rational expectations is given by:
¼t+1 ¡ ¼¤ = (1 ¡
®µ
1 ¡ Á
)(¼t ¡ ¼¤) + et+1 + ®ut+1: (15)
With a known inﬂation target, the inﬂation forecasting model consistent with rational
expectations is simply:
¼i ¡ ¼¤ = c1;t(¼i¡1 ¡ ¼¤) + vi: (16)
Note that this forecasting equation only the slope parameter, c1 is estimated; thus, in terms
of the forecasting equation, the assumption of a known inﬂation target corresponds to a zero
23restriction on c0 (when the forecasting regression written in terms of deviations of inﬂation
from its target). As in the case of an unknown inﬂation target, constant gain versions of
equations (10) and (11) can be used to model the evolution of the formation of inﬂation
expectations in this case. The one-step-ahead forecast of inﬂation is given by:
¼e
t+1 = ¼¤ + c1;t(¼t ¡ ¼¤); (17)
and again, in the limit of perfect knowledge (that is, as · ! 0), the expectations function
above converges to rational expectations with the slope coeﬃcient cP
1 =
1¡Á¡®µ
1¡Á : This
formulation captures a key rationale for adopting an explicit inﬂation targeting regime:
to reduce the public’s uncertainty and possible confusion about the central bank’s precise
inﬂation objective and thereby to anchor the public’s inﬂation expectations to the central
bank’s objective.17
Eliminating uncertainty about the inﬂation target improves macroeconomic perfor-
mance, in terms of both inﬂation and output stability. The dotted lines in the upper
panel of Figure 9 trace the RE-policy pseudo-frontiers in the case of a known inﬂation
target. For comparison, the dashed lines show the pseudo-frontiers assuming that the in-
ﬂation target is not known by the public (this repeats the curves shown in Figure 5 for our
benchmark case, · = 0:05). Recall that the pseudo-frontier is obtained by evaluating the
performance of the economy under imperfect knowledge for the set of policies for ! 2 (0;1]
given by equation (8) that would be optimal under perfect knowledge. As seen in the ﬁgure,
economic outcomes are clearly more favorable when the inﬂation target is assumed to be
perfectly known than otherwise. Still, the resulting pseudo-frontiers lie well to the northeast
of those that would obtain under perfect knowledge. Evidently, imperfect knowledge of the
dynamic process for inﬂation alone has large costs in terms of performance, especially when
expectations are very important for determining inﬂation outcomes, represented by the case
of Á = 0:9.
17The adoption of inﬂation targeting may aﬀect the private formation of expectations in other ways than
by tying down the ultimate inﬂation objective. For instance, Svensson (2002) argues that inﬂation-targeting
central banks should also make explicit their preference weighting, !, which in principle could further
reduce the public’s uncertainty about policy objectives. However, given the remaining uncertainty about
model parameters (® and Á in our model), the uncertainty about the value of c1 is not eliminated in this
case. The extent to which this uncertainty may be reduced is left to further research.
24The basic ﬁnding that, relative to the perfect knowledge benchmark, policy should be
more vigilant against inﬂation under imperfect knowledge also obtains in the case of a known
inﬂation target. The lower panels of Figure 9 show the optimal values of µ for the three
cases we consider: perfect knowledge, imperfect knowledge with known ¼¤, and imperfect
knowledge with unknown ¼¤. When ¼¤ is known, the optimal choice of µ is slightly lower
than when ¼¤ is unknown. Even with a known inﬂation target, however, it remains optimal
to be more vigilant against inﬂation relative to the perfect knowledge case. An exception
is the extreme case of ! = 1 when the optimal value of µ is exactly unity, the same value
that obtains under perfect knowledge.18
A striking result, seen most clearly in the case of Á = 0:9, is that the optimal value of µ
is relatively insensitive over a large range of values for the stabilization preference weight,
!, whether the inﬂation is known or unknown. By contrast, under perfect knowledge, the
optimal value of µ is quite sensitive to !. An implication of this ﬁnding is that with imperfect
knowledge, there is relatively little “cost” associated with policies designed as if inﬂation
were the central bank’s primary objective, even when policymakers place substantial value
in reducing output variability in fact. By contrast, as shown above, the costs of optimizing
policies that incorrectly place a large weight on output stability under the assumption
of perfect knowledge can be quite large. This asymmetry suggests that the practice of
concentrating attention primarily on price stability in the formulation of monetary policy
may be seen as a robust strategy for achieving both a high degree of price stability and a
high degree of economic stability.
8 Conclusion
We examine the eﬀects of a relatively modest deviation from rational expectations resulting
from perpetual learning on the part of economic agents with imperfect knowledge. The pres-
ence of imperfections in the formation of expectations makes the monetary policy problem
considerably more diﬃcult than would appear under rational expectations. Using a simple
18In this limiting case, estimates of c1 are symmetrically distributed around zero. Hence, in terms of a
simple rule of the form given by equation 4, there is no gain from over-responding, relative to the case of
perfect knowledge, to actual inﬂation.
25linear model, we show that although inﬂation expectations are nearly eﬃcient, imperfect
knowledge raises the persistence of inﬂation and distorts the policymaker’s tradeoﬀ between
inﬂation and output stabilization. As a result, policies that appear eﬃcient under rational
expectations can result in economic outcomes signiﬁcantly worse than would be expected
by analysis based on the assumption of perfect knowledge. The costs of failing to account
for the presence of imperfect knowledge are particularly pronounced for policymakers who
place a relatively greater value on stabilizing output: A strategy emphasizing tight inﬂation
control can yield superior economic performance, in terms of both inﬂation and output sta-
bility, than can policies that appear eﬃcient under rational expectations. More generally,
policies emphasizing tight inﬂation control reduce the persistence of inﬂation and the inci-
dence of large deviations of expectations from the policy objective, thereby mitigating the
inﬂuence of imperfect knowledge on the economy. In addition, tighter control of inﬂation
makes the economy less prone to costly stagﬂationary episodes.
The adoption and eﬀective communication of an explicit numerical inﬂation target also
mitigate the inﬂuence of imperfect knowledge on the economy. Communication of an in-
ﬂation target may greatly improve attainable macroeconomic outcomes and aﬀord greater
economic stability relative to the outcomes that are attainable when the public perceives
the policymaker’s ultimate inﬂation objective less clearly. These results highlight the po-
tential value of communicating central bank’s inﬂation objective and of continued vigilance
against inﬂation in anchoring inﬂation expectations and fostering macroeconomic stability.
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Eﬃcient Policy Frontier with Perfect Knowledge
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Notes: The top panel shows the eﬃcient policy frontier corresponding to optimal policies for
diﬀerent values of the relative preference for inﬂation stabilization !, for the two speciﬁed
parameterizations of ® and Á. The bottom panel shows the optimal response to inﬂation
corresponding to the alternative weights ! which are identical for the two parameterizations.
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Evolution of Economy Following Inﬂation Shocks
(Á = 0:75;® = 0:25)
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33Figure 4
Estimated Intercept Following Inﬂation Shocks
(Á = 0:75;® = 0:25)
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34Figure 5
Outcomes with RE-policy (Á = 0:75;® = 0:25)
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Notes: Each panel shows the eﬃcient frontier with perfect knowledge and corresponding
outcomes when the RE-optimal policies are adopted while, in fact, knowledge is imperfect.
The square, triangle, and diamond correspond to preference weights ! = f0:25;0:5;0:75g,
respectively.
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Eﬃcient Policy Response to Inﬂation (Á = 0:75;® = 0:25)
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Notes: The solid line in each panel shows the optimal value of µ under perfect knowledge
for alternative values of the relative preference for inﬂation stabilization !. Remaining lines
show the eﬃcient one-parameter policy under imperfect knowledge.
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Policymaker Loss (Á = 0:75;® = 0:25)
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Notes: The two panels show the loss corresponding to alternative values of the relative
preference for inﬂation stabilization ! for diﬀerent assumptions regarding knowledge and
diﬀerent model parameterizations. The solid line shows the case of perfect knowledge.
The dashed line shows the outcomes assuming the policymaker chooses µ assuming perfect
knowledge when knowledge is in fact imperfect. The dashed-dotted line shows the outcomes
for the eﬃcient one-parameter policy under imperfect knowledge.
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Inﬂation Persistence (Á = 0:75;® = 0:25)
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows the population ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of inﬂation corresponding
to policies based on alternative inﬂation stabilization weights !. For each value of !, the
solid line shows the inﬂation persistence in the benchmark case of rational expectations
with perfect knowledge. The dashed line shows the corresponding persistence when policy
follows the RE-optimal solution but knowledge is imperfect. The dash-dot line shows the
persistence associated with the eﬃcient one-parameter rule with imperfect knowledge.
38Figure 9
Comparing Policies with a Known and Unknown Inﬂation Target
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Eﬃcient Response to Inﬂation
(Á = 0:75;® = 0:25) (Á = 0:9;® = 0:1)
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Notes: The dotted lines indicate economic outcomes (top panel) and eﬃcient policy re-
sponses (bottom panel) with perpetual learning when the policymaker’s inﬂation target is
assumed to be perfectly known. The solid and dashed lines correspond, respectively, to the
perfect knowledge benchmark and the case of perpetual learning with an unknown inﬂation
target. See also the notes to ﬁgures 5 and 6.
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